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Supporting secure applications in a distributed environment faces several challenges. 
Scalable security in the context of multicasting is especially hard when privacy and 
authenticity is to be assured to highly dynamic groups where the application allows 
participants to join at any time. 
The proposals for multicasting security solutions that have been published so far are 
complex, often are inefficient. In this thesis, we propose a security protocol for achieving 
scalable security within JetMeeting, an application based on a P2P communication. Our 
solutions assure that newly joining group members are not able to use the group secure 
services without the group key. 
For versatility, our secure protocol supports a scheme for key management, which is devised 
for Group Key Manager election, Group Key generation, periodic rekey and encrypted 
transmission. Operations have low complexity for joins with low overhead, thus granting 
scalability even for large groups. 
In this thesis we present our implementation based on the existing cryptographic methods. 
The benefits of this implementation are that it provides the dynamic and decentralized group 
key management, minimizes the transmissions required to distribute the initialized group key 
and to rekey the multicast group, as well as multiple simultaneously get the same 
transmission with one group key. The system was evaluated by experimental tests, and the 
results provide evidence of its efficiency and scalability. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The technology that enables the distributed computing is called peer-to-peer computing or 
peer-to-peer networking; most people simply refer to it as P2P. Aiming to ease the problems 
associated with making a variety of items available to multiple users over the Internet, P2P 
describes an environment where computers connect to each other in a distributed 
environment that does not use a centralized control point to route or connect data traffic. 
Many factors today make P2P practical for a wide number of applications. These factors 
include the explosion of connected devices, the rapid increase of affordable bandwidth 
acceleration of computing power, lager storage capacities. P2P is applied to a wide range of 
technologies that greatly increase the utilization of information, bandwidth, and computing 
resources in the Internet. 
In practice, P2P technologies deployed today adopt a network-based computing style that 
neither exclude nor inherently depends on centralized control points. In general, P2P is more 
a style of computing that makes the network interactions more symmetrical. 
P2P gives peers control to use and access their data as they see fit. P2P applications are 
flexible and tolerance of errors. They replicate data as needed and broadcast data to multicast 
computers. 
1.lJXTA 
JXT A provides a P2P platform technology and a community of resources necessary to 
develop new P2P applications. Unlike first-generation peer-to-peer networks, which are tired 
to a specific application, JXT A is an open network computing platform designed for P2P 
computing and mostly developed by Sun Microsystems. JXTA's goal is to develop basic 
building blocks and services to enable innovative applications for peer groups [1-3]. JXTA 
technology is a network programming and computing platform that is designed to solve a 
number of problems in modern distributed computing, especially in the area broadly referred 
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to as peer-to-peer networking [4]. JXTA framework provides a set of protocols and a series 
of services that let peers to find each other, form groups and directly exchange messages [1]. 
JXTA Application 
JXT A Service 
JXTACore 
Figure 1. JXT A Architecture 
JXTA software architecture is divided into three layers, as shown in figure 1. 
• Platform Layer, also known as the JXT A core, encapsulates minimal and 
essential primitives that are common to P2P networking. It includes building 
blocks to enable discovery, transport with firewall handling, the creation of peers 
and peer groups, and associated security primitives. 
• Service Layer includes network services that may not be absolutely necessary for 
a P2P network to operate, but are common or desirable in the P2P environment. 
Examples of network services include searching and indexing, directory, storage 
systems, file sharing, distributed file systems, and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
services. 
• Application Layer includes implementation of integrated applications, such as 
P2P instant messaging, document and resource sharing. 
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JXT A network is an ad hoc, multi-hop, and adaptive network composed of connected peers 
as shown in figure 2. JXT A peers advertise their services in XML documents called 
advertisements. Advertisements enable other peers on the network to learn how to connect to, 
and interact with, a peer's services. JXT A peers use pipes to send messages to one another. A 
peer can send and receive messages, and will cache advertisements. A rendezvous peer is like 
any other peer, however, it also forward discovery requests to help other peers discover 
resources. A relay peer maintains information about the routes to other peers and routes 
messages to peers. A peer first looks in its local cache for more route information. If it isn't 
found, the peer sends queries to relay peers asking for route information. Relay peers also 
forward messages on the behalf of peers that cannot directly address another peer (e.g. NAT 







Figure 2. JXTA Network 
JXTA supports protocols other than HTTP, such as TCP and IP broadcasting, so it is able to 
choose the most efficient protocols for each situation. Using the JXTA protocols, peers can 
cooperate to form self-organized and self configured peer groups independently of their 
positions in the network (edges, firewalls), and without the need of a centralized management 
infrastructure. 
1.2 JetMeeting 
JetMeeting, a project undertaken by Academic Information Technologies at Iowa State 
University, is a web-based application that provides P2P synchronous services to uPortal 
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groups. JetMeeting can be used to hold meetings with other students and/or the instructor and 
permits the sharing of text, audio, graphics and applications. JetMeeting focuses on multicast 
and dynamic group communication in which a group comprises peers with a specific 
common interest within the network. 
The usage paradigm of JetMeeting tool is very similar to that of entering a group meeting 
room. The peer joins a group and uses one or more of the collaborative tools including chat, 
whiteboard, audio or application sharing in the process of the meeting. Each peer joins a 
unique group for the meeting and from then on all communication happen over the JXT A 
platform. JetMeeting is a Java application that is in the JXTA's application layer. JetMeeting 
architecture is illustrated in Figure 3. 
uPortal Server Responsibilities: 
-Registering and deregistering peers 
-Receiving commands requesting the 
groups information 
-Searching groups list registered by 
peers 
-Sending response with groups list 
Peer Responsibilities: 
-Registering and deregistering with uPortal server 
-Sending request to uPortal to get group attributes 
-Receiving responses from uPortal containing a list of 
groups 
-Sending commands to other peers to request a 
specific service 
-Receiving commands from other peers requesting a 
specific service 
-Processing service request and executing the 
requested service 
-Sending a response to a peer's request for a service 
Figure 3. J etMeeting Architecture 
JetMeeting is not a pure P2P system and uses a central server, uPortal, to verify the identity 
of the login peers when new peers connect to JetMeeting. All other communication between 
peers is conducted in a P2P fashion, with messages flowing directly from one peer's machine 
to another's without uPortal intermediary. uPortal server is responsible for interacting with 
the back-end database that maintains all the data pertaining to the system. The peers log in to 
the uPortal server through a web interface and access a set of tools that enable group 
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management. Once the group management is enabled, JetMeeting tool provides the fully 
decentralized collaborative environment to the peers, which communicate with each other 
directly within one group, rather than through uPortal. JetMeeting has been a scalable and 
efficient system for messaging collaborating. 
Chat is one of major tools of JetMeeting. The most popular commercial chat solutions use a 
centralized implementation. In short, all interactions go through one or more central servers 
that provide an accurate directory of connected members and route all messages. The JXT A 
technology is ideally suited for chat implementations. The fully-decentralized solution was 
the simplest because JXT A platform takes care of all the underlying issues to discover and 
communicate with other peers. JXT A handles the discovery of other nodes and the secure 
routing and exchange of user and inter-application messages among them. 
The uPortal has basic security solutions for peers' and groups' management. Once the peer 
logs in uPortal server, the system checks the database to make sure which groups this peer 
belongs to, then assigns this peer with the group IDs and group attribution, such as secure 
group chat or not secure group chat. The above information ensures that the peers can only 
join the limited groups and work in a trusting environment but the communication between 
peers is not guaranteed to be privacy and integrity. 
1.3 Secure Group Chat Scenario 
There is a scenario that stresses the group key management infrastructure. This scenario is 
secure group chat in JetMeeting, which deals with the peer's need to communicate with the 
other peers with encrypted multicast messages. Secure group chat is more demanding from a 
key management perspective than other JetMeeting's tools for several reasons. First, the 
group members of secure group chat need to simultaneously keep the same group key. The 
group should have a manager to generate and periodically update the group key. The group 
key needs to be distributed securely and automatically, but not manually. This scenario 
involves that the group members require to dynamically join or to leave from the group 
within one second. The secure group chat scenario has a fairly thorough set of security 
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requirement, covering access control, member to member authentication, data confidentiality, 
and data integrity. Finally, the notion of availability to this scenario, which means that the 
peer, who provides the group key management service, must be up. 
1.4 Security Issues 
Security of most existing P2P platforms is not as critical as for enterprises which weigh 
adopting P2P for collaboration across their organizations as well as in the Internet. As a 
consequence they do not address security issues to the extent that is required by the 
enterprises [5]. Current solutions often require human intervention (manual keying is 
common), or restrict the dynamics provided by multicasting and required by many 
applications. Multi-party communication applications based on dynamical and decentralized 
P2P networks introduce a new bunch of security issues. 
The secure multicast requirement is the necessary for multiple users who share the same 
security attributes and communication requirements to securely communicate with every 
other member of the multicast group using a group key. The largest benefit of the multicast 
communication is that multiple receivers simultaneously get the same transmission. Thus the 
problem is enabling each user to determine/obtain the same group key without permitting 
unauthorized parties to do likewise (initializing the multicast group) securely rekeying the 
users of the multicast group when necessary. 
This thesis shows that multicast communications have dynamically changing requirements, 
which will make it very challenging requirements from a key management perspective to 
address. The purpose of this thesis is to develop key management schemes, which guarantee 
that at each instance in time only actual group members will be possession of the 
cryptographic key needed to participate. This thesis aims at applying the concepts of group 
key management into JetMeeting in order to provide an efficient and a scalable security 
infrastructure. The employment of the protocol will be described in the following sections. 
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The thesis starts by explaining group key management issues and the model of threat we are 
concerned about and the various sorts of security services we can provide. Next we provide 
an overview of cryptographic algorithms how to put them together to implement these 
security services. Then we evaluate the system efficiency, fault tolerance and scalability. 
This thesis draws conclusions and explores a summary some possible enhancements to this 
system. 
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2. GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
There are many factors that must be taken into account when developing the desired key 
management architecture. Important issues, particular to multicast groups include: 
• What are the security requirements of the group members? Most likely there will 
be some group key manager, or managers. 
• How does the formation of the multicast group occur? Will the group key 
manager initiate the group member joining process, or will the group members 
initiate when they join the multicast group? 
• One must minimize the number of bits required for multicast group key 
distribution. This greatly impacts bandwidth-limited equipments. 
All of these issues need to be taken into account, along with a threat model. The threat model 
describes what resources we expect the attacker to have available and what attacks the 
attacker can be expected to mount [6]. Nearly every security system is vulnerable to some 
threat or another. 
JetMeeting assumes a threat model and wants to protect the communications. The group 
member is threatened by outside attacks such as sniffing. It assumes attacker snoop 
communication and retrieve confidential information. Some may even impersonate 
businesses and spoof and defraud others. JetMeeting security is designed to ward off attacks 
ranging from traffic analysis to eavesdropping to message tampering. 
In addition to the threat model, we made two deployment assumptions. First, no central 
security administration is available. The security system should operate in a decentralized 
environment. Second, the security infrastructure should scale up to hundreds of members and 
the members dynamically to join and leave the group. 
In our system, we adopt a security protocol that relies on existing and trusted technologies. 
Such technologies are made practical as a consequence of two choices recently made: the 
adoption of X.509 Digital Certificate and the existing encryption/decryption for the secure 
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transport of information; the exploitation of the end-to-end transport independence of JXT A 
protocol. The advantages of this approach are clear. Because no new invention is required, 
plans for applications development and deployment can proceed with minimal delay. 
The threat model together with the existing trusted technologies and assumptions leads us to 
the cryptography-based security protocol (in particular, PKI) with unrestricted certificate 
issuance and end-to-end message encryption and authentication. In this thesis, we 
concentrate on a secure, efficient, scalable and practical protocol. 
The security protocol provides mechanisms to disseminate group policy and generate group 
key. To protect the privacy of the data not to be tampered by the attackers, encryption is the 
most direct way to address this issue. Because asymmetric encryption consumes more 
processing time and memory for calculations than symmetric key encryption, a combination 
of symmetric and asymmetric is used in our security protocol. Public key encryption is used 
to securely exchange a set of symmetric key materials. After this is done, symmetric 
encryption can be used to encrypt the service data with the symmetric key. This combination 
of public key encryption and symmetric encryption provides fast message encryption with 
the benefits of certificate-based key management. 
The major issue of this security protocol is the key management in dynamic groups. The key 
for multicast services is called Group Key (GK). Group key management, especially in a 
group for multicasting is the corner stone for all other security services [7]. We will set up a 
key management protocol to manage the group keys with a dynamic distributed approach. 
This approach works well for honest groups and not very large groups. 
For multicast security, several key management schemes have been proposed, e.g. the Group 
Key Management Protocol (GKMP)[8][9], and the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [10]. They 
are complex and inefficient in dealing this issue. Our group key management approach 
efficiently and securely distributes a Group Key to members as they join. 
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3. GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL 
This section presents a group key management protocol in this security system. It is run 
between a group member and a Group Key Manager (GKM), which establishes security 
associations among authorized group members. 
The protocol described below, delegates key generation and distribution functions to the 
members themselves rather than relying on a third party for these functions. As prelude to 
actually distributing key, a few things must be assumed: there exists a reliable "group key 
manager" responsible for creating and distributing keys to group members with certification. 
Figure 4 shows this group key management's architecture, which is consisted of 4 functions: 
GKM Election, GK Generation, GK Distribution, and Rekey. 
GK Generation 
Figure 4. Group Key Management Architecture 
For secure group communications to take place, all members must obtain the same key. This 
may be achieved by both using deterministic key generation techniques (Using a secret, 
shared seed) and by making one member of the group responsible creation of the key [8]. 
The use of a deterministic key generator presents security problems, particularly regarding 
lots of the seed. The assignment of a member to the role of key manager also presents 
drawbacks, but these relate to determining which one should be the manager and the need for 
each group member to contact it. Below describes the Group Key Manager election. 
3.1 Group Key Manager 
The Group Key Manager is a group member with authority to perform critical actions. GKM 
is made responsible for initial group key and periodic generation and distribution of new 
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rekey message. All group members dynamically have the capability to be a GKM and could 
assume this duty upon assignment. The Group Key Manager should be active for all time and 
only one Group Key Manager should be active for the entire group. The GKM helps the 
cryptographic group reach and maintain key synchronization. A group must operate on the 
same symmetric cryptographic key. If part of the group loses or inappropriately changes the 
key, it will not be able to send or receive data to another member on the correct key. 
Therefore, it is important that those operations that create or change the key are unambiguous 
and controlled. The GKM interacts with other management functions in the network to 
provide the group key management with group membership lists and group relevant 
commands. The GKM deals strictly with cryptographic. 
3.2 Group Key Generation 
The Group Key Manager creates a group key for use in the group. The creation of a 
cryptographic key requires that the key be sufficiently random. Cryptographic randomness 
doesn't mean just statistical randomness, although that's part of it. For a sequence to be 
cryptographically secure pseudo-random, it must be unpredictable what the next random bit 
will be, given complete knowledge of the algorithm or hardware generating the sequence and 
all of the previous bits in the stream [11]. The key is generally the seed used to set the initial 
state of the generator. 
Like any cryptographic algorithm, cryptographically secure pseudo-random-sequence 
generators are subject to attack. Making generators resistant to attack is what cryptography is 
all about. 
To generate random numbers, we find a whole lot of seemingly random events and distill 
randomness from them. This randomness then is stored in a pbol that applications can draw 
on as needed. SHA-1 hash function is ready-made for the job; it is fast, so we can shovel 
quite a bit through them without worrying too much about performance or the actual 
randomness of each observation. Hash function takes an arbitrary amount of input and 
produces an output mixing all the input bits. The use of multiple random inputs with a strong 
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hash function can overcome weakness in any particular input. Using an "encryption" 
algorithm with a random key and seed value to encrypt and feedback the output encrypted 
value into the value to be encrypted for the next iteration is the mechanism to generate a 
secure key in our security protocol. 
3.3 Group Key Distribution 
After the group key is generated, the GKM calls a listener to listen other group members' key 
request message. Before the group key is distributed, the GKM must verify the identity and 
permissions of each member prior to the key being distributed. Likewise, the group member 
must verify GKM's identity to perform this action and permissions. 
The key being distributed is the same secure level as the data that it will encrypt. Hence, we 
must encrypt the key during distribution. To implement a successful security key distribution, 
here needs to be a strong notion of identity to identify the group members. This requirement 
suggests the use of a full Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with the use of Certification 
Agencies (CA) [12]. 
PKI is a good fit for JXT A because X509 certificates are robust enough to allow peer groups, 
peers services to be uniquely identified, authenticated and scoped to specific roles. The 
private key is used to create something called a digital signature and public key encryption 
bears to secret-key encryption; sender use its private key to sign a message and the receiver 
uses sender's public key to verify the sender's signature. The digital signature has one 
important property: nonrepudiation. The recipient can prove that the sender signed the 
message and the sender cannot deny it. 
Digital certificate comes from an X509 CA willing to vouch for an identity and public-key 
pair. CA policies vary, depending on the strength of authentication required by users and the 
CA's specific functional requirements. The notion of a centralized CA is not appropriate to 
the world of peer-to-peer application and is at times contradictory. Large numbers of peers 
could want to conduct a secure transaction without involving a centralized infrastructure. 
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In our system, we let peers become their own certificate, authorities; generate their own root 
certificate that verifies that they are associated with a public key, which is presented with a 
pair of values: modulus and public exponent. The length of these pair keys is 2048 bits. The 
peer holds the private key for the certificate; the subject of the certificate describes the peer, 
its identifier and its creator. A fingerprint hash of the public key embedded in the certificate 
is used as the source of ID providing a tight binding between the identifier and the 
authenticator. The public key data associated with the certificate can be used to sign and 
encrypt message traffic. The expiry date of the certificate is on the order of the lifetime of the 
peer. When a PKI is implemented, the private key must be kept in a secure data store 
accessible only to the JXTA peer that is authorized to access it. 
Version: 3 
IssuerDN: O=www.jxta.org, L=SF, C=US, CN=jnushareuser-CA, 
0U=99CEBA4D8294A0493C8A 
Start Date: Sat May 22 15:36:57 EDT 2004 
Final Date: Thu May 22 15:36:57 EDT 2014 
SubjectDN: O=www.jxta.org, L=SF, 
OU=99CEBA4D8294A0493C8A 









public exponent: 11 
C=US, 
Signature Algorithm: SHAl WithRSAEncryption 







Figure 5. X.509 Certificate Format 
CN=jnushareuser-CA, 
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X.509 is the most widely used standard for digital certificates. In our system, the certificate is 
represented as figure 5. It shows a view of certificate generated by peer's own. 
JXT A allows to establish a secure communication which provides security by means of 
cryptographic materials: X.509 certificates and RSA keys. This material is generated when 
JXTA is launched and then stored in the JXTA's Personal Security Environment (pse) 
directory (pse/). This certificate is included in the peer advertisement. 
A secure communication should provide peer authentication, encryption and message 
integrity [12]. It is divided into two phase, the handshake and data transfer phase. The 
handshake phase authenticates the GKM and the group member, exchanges certificates, 
which are used to protect the data to be transmitted. The handshake must be completed 
before any application data can be transmitted. Once this has been done, the group key is 
transmitted as a series of protected records. 
Group Member GKM 
Handshake: Hello .. 
Handshake: Hello 
.... Handshake: Certificate 
.... Handshake: CertificateReguest 
.... Handshake: GKMHe11oDone 
.... 
Handshake: Certificate 
Handshake: Finished .. .. 
Handshake: Finished 
.... Encr)'.pted GroupKe)'. 
.... 
Close Notifx .. 
Figure 6. Time sequence of Secure Communication 
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The idea here is that the peer uses SHA-1 to hash the certificate and its private key to encrypt 
the content of the certificate, which is stored as signature in the certificate, thus proving that 
the peer has possession of the private key corresponding to the certificate and the certificate 
content is not revised during the transmission. The group member authenticate is initiated by 
GKM sending a CertificateRequestMsg message to the group member. The group member 
responds by sending a CertificateMsg message, which is a string signed with Sha-1 hash and 
RSA algorithms. Figure 6 shows the timeline for this process. 
The purpose of the handshake is that GKM and group member authenticate each other. The 
overall process works like this: 
• The group member and the GKM exchange their certificates, which include the 
public keys. 
•Verify the certificates and extract the public keys. 
• GKM encrypts the group key with an asymmetric encryption method. 
The above process accomplishes two goals, first, is to authenticate the GKM and the group 
member as well as provide the certificates. Steps 1 and 2 accomplish the first goal. Steps 2 
and 3 accomplish the second goal, establishing secure communications. In step 2 group 
member provides the GKM with its certificate, which allows group member to transmit a 
secret to GKM. After step 2, both of the group member and the GKM keep each other's 
public key. 
Note that step 3 is the key step in the whole process. What is going on is very simple: the 
GKM uses the group member's public key (extracted from the certificate) to encrypt the 
group key for data integrity, and GKM uses its private key to re-encrypt the encrypted group 
key for authentication. The rest of the handshake is mainly devoted to ensuring that this 
exchange can happen safely. The entire process serves to protect the delivering group key 
procedure itself from tampering. Imagine an attacker who wished to pretend to be the group 
member to steal the group key. The attacker could not get the group key because it does not 
have the group member's private key to decrypt the message. 
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4. GROUP KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The Group Key Management protocol is used to establish secure communications among 
group members within a group. In this section, we will look into the details of the 
implementation of group key management and of how to establish secure communications. 
The implementation of secure communication within a group has been developed using Java 
1.4 and JXTA 2.1 to be platform-independent. The purpose of this security protocol and 
implementation is to make the JetMeeting application based on P2P to have a secure group 
communication and manage the group key within a dynamic group. Initial experience with 
the protocol has enabled to improve the security of JetMeeting. 
4.1 Create a peer group 
Before a peer becomes a member within a group, it needs to access uPortal to be authorized. 
UPortal verifies the peer's authentication, gets the information of groups, which the peer 
belongs to. Below shows the response information from uPortal: 
Group Name, Group ID, Specification; 
Group Name, Group ID, Specification; 
How peers are authenticated by uPortal is not this thesis's business. 
To create a new peer group, the first thing to do is to construct a peer group advertisement. A 
peer group advertisement describes the peer group and contains the following fields. 
• Peer group ID: the URN uniquely identifies the peer group. 
• Specification: This is used to retrieve the module implementation advertisement of 
the group, which contains a list of all the services available within the group. 
JetMeeting can provide secure group communication and non-secure group 
communication. We use the module spec ID to identify group communication types. 
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• Description: the description of the group. 
Based on the information coming from uPortal, the content of the group advertisement is 
generated. From the peer group advertisement, the group can be instantiated. 
4.2 Join a Group 
Once a group member is authenticated, it needs to be able to use services within the group. 
Joining a group is done in four steps using the secure group membership service. The secure 
group membership services consist of GKM election, Group Key generation and Group Key 
distribution. Within the group, all the membership services match the JXTA two steps 
scheme for membership appliance. Figure 7 shows the joining procedure. 
Existing Peer 1 Existing Peer 2 Existing Peer 3 
Figure 5. New Peer Joins a Group 
Step 1: The newly joining peer calls apply() method to generate a WholsGKMMsg message. 
See figure 6. 
Source ID: Newly Joining Peer 
Message Type: WholsGKM 
Figure 6. WholsGKMMsg Format 
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Step 2: The new peer broadcasts WholsGKMMsg over the group. Broadcast messaging is 
very economical because there is only one message sent. Broadcasting is very useful there 
are many members that could answers a query, but you don't know which one has the 
answer. 
Step 3: When a peer receives the WholsGKMMsg, it checks its Boolean value GKM. If this 
value is True, it means that this peer is the Group Key Manager, and then it generates a 
GKMConfirmedMsg (As shown in figure 7). If the peer's Boolean value GKM equals to 
false, it means that this peer is not the GKM, and then it just discards the WholsGKMMsg. 
Step 4:GKM sends GKMConfirmedMsg back to the newly joining peer. 
Source ID: GKM 
Destination ID: Newly Joining Peer 
Message Type: GKM Confirmed 
Figure 7. GKMConfirmedMsg Format 
After the new peer receives the GKMConfirmedMsg from the GKM, it starts the Group Key 
requirement procedure. If it does not receive any response after it sends out WholsGKMMsg, 
this means that the current group does not contain a GKM. The newly joining peer is the first 
peer in the group. So this peer calls the GKM election function, then it is automatically 
elected as the Group Key Manager and calls the listener to wait for other peer's 
WholsGKMMsg. 
4.3 Elect a Group Key Manager 
After the group has been instantiated, a peer needs to become a Group Key Manager within 
this group. Electing the Group Key Manager's policy is: the peer who is the first one to join 
the group will be automatically elected as the Group Key Manager within the group. If the 
Group Key Manager leaves the group, it will pass the Group Key Manager's responsibility to 
the peer who is the last one to join the group. 
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The scenario presented below is a brief summary of the Group Key Manager election 
procedure. 
Newly joining peer Alice sends out a WholsGKMMsg on the network, if no one reply the 
inquiry, Alice configures itself as the Group Key Manager. The GKM configuration looks 
like this: 
Boolean GKM = True; 
MemberList: records the IDs of the joined group members 
After the Group Key Manager is configured, it calls the listener() to listen the 
WholsGKMMsg and calls GenerateKey() function to generate the group key, which is used 
for secure communications within the group. If GKM receives the WholsGKMMsg, it calls 
GroupKeyDistribution() function to distribute the group key with a secure way. 
When the current Group key Manager, Alice, plans to leave the group, before leaving, it 
selects peer Bob who is the last one to join the group to be the new Group Key Manager, and 
sends a GKMLeavingMsg (Figure 8) to Bob. 
Source ID: GKM 
Destination ID: Bob 
Message Type: GKM Leaving 
Content: Member List 
Figure 8. GKMLeavingMsg Format 
When Bob receives the GKMLeavingMsg, it changes its Boolean value GKM to be True, and 
calls the listener to wait for the WholsGKMMsg and sends back a confirmation to inform the 
former GKM that Bob has been the new GKM. When Alice receives the confirmation, it 
changes its GKM value to False and then leaves the group. 
Figure 9 describes the procedure about how to re-elect a new Group Key Manager. 
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When a new peer joins in the group and broadcasts the GKMRequestMsg, Bob will response 
the GKMConfirmedMsg as the new Group Key Manager. 
1.Selects Bob as the new GKM and 
creates GKMLeavingMsg; 
2. Sends GKMLeavingMsg to Bob; 
5. Sets GKM = False and leaves 
this group. 
2.Receives GKMLeavingMsg; 
3. Sets GKM =True; 
Calls GKMRequest listener; 
4.Sends GKM changed 
confirmation. 
Figure 9. Re-elect a New Group Key Manager 
4.4 Generate a Group Key 
There's already a random-number generator built into Java, a mere function call away. This 
random-number generator is almost definitely not secure enough for cryptography, and 
probably not even very random. Our secure group chat is extremely sensitive to the 
properties of random-number generator, who generates the Group Key. 
This system demands much more of a pseudo-random-sequence generator than do most other 
applications. Cryptographic randomness doesn't mean just statistical randomness, although 
that's part of it. For a sequence to be cryptographically secure pseudo-random, it must have 
this property: 
It is unpredictable. It must be computationally infeasible to predict what the 
next random bit will be, given complete knowledge of the algorithm or 
hardware generating the sequence and all of the previous bits in the stream. 
[14). 
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The output of a generator satisfying this property will be good enough for the key generation, 
and the system, which requires a truly random sequence generator. The primary point is to 
generate a sequence of bits that the attacker is unlikely to guess. 
To achieve a cryptographically secure pseudo-random sequence, the best way is to find a 
whole lot of seemingly random events and distill randomness from them. This randomness 
can then be stored in a pool that applications can draw on as needed. Hash function, SHA-1, 
is ready-made for the job; so we can shovel quite a bit through SHA-1 without worrying too 
much about performance or the actual randomness of each observation. 
To generate secure pseudo random data, a much better initial seed must be used. Seed is our 
random number and generates our next random number. Here we use the recommendation of 
rfc2412 for a choice of a seed. These are the first 160 bits of the binary expansion of pseudo 
integer [13]: 
private static byte[] seed = { 
(byte) OxC9, (byte) OxOF, (byte) OxDA, (byte) OxA2, 
(byte) Ox21, (byte) Ox68, (byte) OxC2, (byte) Ox34, 
(byte) OxC4, (byte) OxC6, (byte) Ox62, (byte) Ox8B, 
(byte) Ox80, (byte) OxDC, (byte) OxlC, (byte) OxDJ, 
(byte) Ox29, (byte) Ox02, (byte) Ox4E, (byte) Ox08 
}; 




To implement a much better churn, generate some random values by getting System time 
and adding a little randomness by XO Ring a few bits of the amount of free memory. 
*I 
private synchronized byte[} getChurn() 
long msecs = System.currentTimeMillis(); II 64 bits 
long fmem = rtime.freeMemory(); 
msecs A= fmem & OxFF; 
byte[] tmp =new byte[timeLength]; 
II copy into byte array 
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for (inti = O; i < timeLength; i++) { 
} 
tmp[i] = (byte)((msecs >>> (8*(7 - i))) & OxFF); 
} 
return tmp; 
After calling getChurn() enough to build up sufficient randomness in Randpool, we can now 
generate random bits from it with the following generator. 
I** 
*We use SHA-I to generate requested bytes of random data 
*I 
public void generateRand(byte[} buffer, int offset, int length) 
{ 
I** 
* seed is our random number and generates our next random 
*number. Make sure that it cannot be guessed. 
*I 
byte[] churn = getChurn(); 
SHAJ.update(seed, 0, seedLength);llHash the seed; 
SHAJ .do Final( churn, seed); 
} 
The hash function is crucial here. It provides an easy way to generate an arbitrary amount of 
pseudo-random data without calling getChurn() each time. In effect, the system degrades 
gracefully from perfect to practical randomness. In this system, it becomes possible to use the 
result from one generateRand() call to generate a secure Group Key. 
This Group Key will be used in the symmetric encryption/decryption: RC4, RC4 is a 
variable-key-length cipher, with a key that can be anywhere between 8 and 2048 bits long, 
usually in the range of 48 bits to 128 bits. Here we use RC4 with 128 bits key length. 
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4.5 Distribute the Group Key to Other Members 
The other group members must get the group key before the secure group communication is 
fully operational. The purposes of other group member initialization are as follows: 
• Establish a secure mechanism for the transmission of the group key between the 
GKM and group members. 
• Send the key message and group rekey interval to the other member. 
Establishing a secure communication to transmit the group key consists of four messages 
between the GKM and the other members. Figure 10 presents the handshake procedure. 











Close Notify ..... 
..... 
Figure 10. Secure Communication Handshake Messages 
1. The initial messages are for the establishment of security pipe between group member 
and the GKM. The group member sends a HelloHandshakeMsg (As shown in figure 
11) to accomplish this. 
Source ID: Group Member 
Destination ID: GKM 
Message Type: Hello Handshake 
Figure 11. HelloHandshakeMsg Format 
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2. The GKM corresponds to a series of handshake messages. The first message the 
GKM sends is the HelloHandshakeMsg. Next sends its certificate in the 
CertificateMsg (Figure 12). Then it sends a CertificateRequestMsg (As shown in 
figure 13) to the group member. Finally, it sends a HelloDoneMsg, which indicates 
that this phase of the handshake is done. The reason that HelloDoneMsg is needed is 
that some of the more complicated handshake group member receives the 
HelloDoneMsg, it knows that no such other messages will be arriving and so it can 
proceed with its part of the handshake. 
Source ID: GKM/Group Member 
Destination ID: Group Member/GKM 
Message Type: Certificate 
Content: Certificate Content 
Figure 12. CertificateMsg Format 
Source ID: GKM 
Destination ID: Group Member 
Message Type: Certificate Request 
Figure 13. CertificateRequestMsg Format 
3. Group member corresponds to GKM with CertificateMsg, which is initiated by GKM 
sending the CertificateRequestMsg to the group member. 
All we have managed to do so far is to authenticate both the GKM and the group member 
and share some keying material. The purpose of the handshake is to set up the shared state 
required to make sending and receiving protected data possible. 
The GKM must wait until it receives the group member finished message before it can send 
its first byte of data. It's safest to simply wait for the group member's FinishedMsg. 
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Finally, the group member shuts down the connection, but first it sends a close-notify alert to 
indicate that the connection is about to close. 
After the handshake is finished, the GKM creates an EncryptedGrpKeyMsg ( As shown in 
figure 14) which contains the group key generated by the GKM and encrypted with RSA 
asymmetric method. 
Here we use value GroupKeyVersion to assure that at the same time, all the group members 
use the same group key to encrypt/decrypt secure message. When the first Group Key is 
generated, the value of GroupKeyVersion is initialized to 0. When every periodic rekey 
occurs, this number plus 1. 
Source ID: GKM 
Destination ID: Group Member 
Message Type: Group Key 
Message Content: Encrypted Group Key 
Due Time 
Group Key Version: 0 
Figure 14. EncryptedGrpKeyMsg Format 
Asymmetric encryption relies on two different keys (public key and private key) for secure 
interactions. GKM has its own private key and the group member's public key; group 
member has its own private key and the GKM's public key. Figure 15 shows how the group 
key encryption works. 
First, GKM encrypts the group key with the group member's public key and then GKM's 
private key. Because the encryption is reversible, that is the GKM's private key is used to 
encrypt, and the GKM's public key, which is kept by the group member, to decrypt. The 
message is created that essentially prove it came from the owner of the key. The group key is 
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encrypted with the group member's public key, which is kept by the GKM, can only be 
decrypted by the group member's private key. 
Figure 15. Group Key Encryption/ Decryption Procedure 
The JXTA platform supports RSA with PKCS#l padding in this system. Below illustrates 
how RSA is implemented in JXTA's crypto suite. 
RSA rsaAlgorithm = RSA(); 
SecretKey key] = GroupMember _Publickey; 
SecretKey Key2 = GKM_Privatekey; 
byte[] message] = rsaAlgorithm(byte[] GroupKey, int offset, int length, 
key 1, Boolean encrypt); 
byte[] encrypted_GroupKey = rsaAlgorithm(byte[] messagl, int offset, 
int length, key2, Boolean encrypt); 
This approach solves the main problem with symmetric key encryption caused by the 
exchange of what is here a private key because the private keys are never exchanged. 
Asymmetric encryption consumes more processing time and memory for calculations than 
symmetric key encryption. The time to run the asymmetric is livable for group key 
transmission because the group key is not large data. 
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4.6 Group Rekey 
Cryptographic key has a life span. New key must replace "old" group key prior to the end of 
its cryptographic life. This process is rekey. 
Rekey has the advantage of using an existing cryptographic association to distribute key. 
Also, there is no requirement to verify the identity and authorization for the other members. 
Identity and authorization are assumed. 
A group rekey consists of two stages. First the Group Key Manager creates new group key. 
Second the new group key is sent to the group members in a broadcast message. 
Source ID: GKM 
Message Type: Rekey 
Content: Encrypted New Group Key 
Due Time 
Group Key Version 
Figure 16. RekeyMsg Format 
The GKM creates the new group key in exactly the same manner as used during Group Key 
Generation. GKM creates a RekeyMsg (Figure 16). This RekeyMsg uses the current group 
key to encrypt the new key. The encrypted new group key also contains the group key's due 
time and group key version, which identifies the current group key version and makes all 
group members to have the same group key at the same time. All members of the group use 
broadcast to accept this message. 
The GKM encrypts the new group key information with the existing group key. Since all 
group members possess the former group key, the entire group can correctly decrypt this 
message. 
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4.7 Send and Receive Secure Messages within the Group 
Symmetric encryption is a simple but powerful way of secure communication; it has its 
disadvantages because of that single way. However, it is a good and practical method if a 
group of peers needs to send messages that can be read by anyone with a single group key. In 
figure 17, we can see a message being passed among a group. They are using a single key to 
encrypt and decrypt a message. Note that the key was exchanged over the group via our 
group key management protocol. This is very practical for secure group chat where a number 
of group members communicate if all of the group members have unique key so that a 
attacker could not sniff secret messages. Symmetric encryption is widely used because it is 
very fast compared to asymmetric encryption methods. So it becomes increasingly important 
as the size of the data to be encrypted increases. This project uses a combination of 
symmetric and asymmetric methods. Asymmetric method is used to securely exchange the 
group key. After this is done, symmetric encryption is used to encrypt all subsequent 
exchanges, so we can benefit from the best of worlds. 
Message 
All of group members can read message 
because all of them have the same group 
key used to encrypt the mesage 
Encrypt Decrypt 
Figure 17. Encrypt/Decrypt message 
Decrypted 
Message 
Figure 18 summarizes the symmetric algorithms, which are common. As we can see, RC4 is 
by far the fastest algorithm. [6] 
Cipher Key Length Speed(MB/s) 
DES-CBC 56 9 
3DES-CBC 168 3 
RC2-CBC Variable 0.9 
RC4 Variable 45 
Figure 18. Some common cryptographic algorithms (Pentium II 400) 
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JXTA defines a parent interface for symmetric cryptographic algorithm, RC4. RC4 is a 
stream cipher and has been received widespread attention. It is extremely fast; a Pentium 
II/400 can achieve speeds on the order of 45MB/s. Below illustrates how symmetric 
encryption is implemented in JXT A. 
JxtaCrypto suite = new JxtaCryptoSuite( JxtaCrypto.MEMBER_RC4, 
null, (byte)O, (byte)O); 
Cipher rc4 = suite.getJxtaCipher( ); 
rc4.init(GroupKey, Cipher.MODE_ENCRYPT); 
rc4.doFinal(input.message(), 0, input.length(), byte[} encryptedMessage, O); 
The init() method initializes the instance of cipher with the group key. When the message is 
ready, the doFinal() method is called. The doFinal() method performs the encryption or 
decryption. 
When a group member within the group is ready to broadcast the content, it needs to call 
encryption method to create a SecureMsg as follows: 
SecureMsg.type = SECURE_GROUP _CHAT; 
SecureMsg.byte = encryptedMessage; 
SecureMsg.GKversion = GroupKeyVersion; 
After the group members receive the SecureMsg, check the message type and the group key 
version field. If the version number is equal to its current group key version, it then calls 
decryption method to decrypt the message content by RC4 with the current group key. If the 
version number is higher than the current one, it means that this member does not receive the 
GKM's RekeyMsg. Then this member sends a RekeyRequestMsg to the GKM, once the GKM 
gets this message, it will create a RekeyMsg and distribut it to this member. 
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5. EVALUATION 
JetMeeting networks are highly complex because they are unlimited in size. In addition, 
peers are dynamic and unpredictable, as they join and leave frequently. This complexity is 
difficult to mirror without enormous effort. Instead, we decided to use 12 peers from 3 ISPs, 
which include Cox, AOL, and Verizon in North Virginia, to evaluate the system. Although 
this does not reflect the JetMeeting complexity, it reveals the general characters of the system. 
The system has been continuously tested during its development process. To evaluate its 
performance, the following test environment including computers and their physical 
connections are shown in figure 19. 
Windows 2000/XP 
Windows NT 
Figure 19. Test Environment 
Only one peer runs in a computer. Their OS and other settings are as the followings: 
• OS: Windows NT/XP/2000 
• CPU: Pentium 4, 1.1G/1.3G/1.8G/2.4G 
• JXT A: Stable Builds Version 2.1 released in 6/8/2003 
• API: Java JDKl.4.1 
• Peer configuration: simple peer using a relay (due to behind firewall) 
• Transport protocol: TCP and HTTP (due to behind firewall) 
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Before forming a group to collaborate each other, all peers have to first connect to the JXTA 
network. If a peer is properly configured, it will have no problem to connect to the JXTA 
network. In our testing environment, due to each of peers is behind either a firewall or 
connected to the Internet via an ISP, every peer needs to set the HTTP protocol with 
specifying a relay peer and one rendezvous peer on the network. 
At the moment, there currently exist two groups: Cyclone and !SU. Each peer can join either 
Cyclone, which is a secure group, or !SU, which is not a secure group. 
The system evaluations are discussed from the following aspects: 
5.1 Transfer Latency 
We conducted several experiments to measure the transfer latency using the real public 
Internet behavior, including latency and bandwidth unpredictability. One of things we 
measured was the difference in the latency between secure group communication and non-
secure group communication to evaluate the speed performance. 
We repeated ran the tests at same time of different days to minimize the effect of network 
congestion. All the tests occurred between 1 :OOAM and 6:00AM. Below shows the test 
methods: 
(I) Selected PeerP ( p was from 0 to 11) as a Primary Peer, then this peer generated a 
message, which size was 128 bytes, 256 bytes, 384 bytes, 512 bytes, 768bytes, or 
1024 bytes. 
(2) PeerP captured system time to Time P 
(3) Encrypted the message with the group key 
( 4) Broadcasted the encrypted message within the group 
(5) Other 11 peers received the encrypted message 
(6) Then the peers decrypted it 
(7) Replied an empty message to the Primary Peer 
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(8) When the Primary Peer received the response from Peerj (j was from 1 to 11), it 
captured system time to Time j , the difference between Time j and Time P was the 




(9) Calculated the average latency Latency k = -1--------
11 
We repeatedly ran the above test every 5 minutes in each peer. After one round, then they 
started the next round. Totally each peer repeatedly ran 5 times, so all 12 peers totally have 
60 Latency values for the same message size. The average latency for the same size message 
was calculated as the following: 
60 
ILatencyk 
Average Latency = _k=_I ___ _ 
- 60 
To make a better comparison, the first test used encrypted method, which each peer joined 
Cyclone group, which each message was encrypted before it was broadcasted within the 
group and the message was decrypted before the peer replied a response to the Primary Peer. 
Next, we tested using the same method, but each peer joined !SU group and the message was 
broadcasted without step 3 and 6. Table 1 shows the test average values in milliseconds (ms). 
Messa e Size 
ted 
Table 1. Average latency of round trip message transfer 
The test result shows that all messages have been correctly passed among group members; it 
also shows that encrypted message transfer and non-encrypted message transfer are both in 
the same latency. As we expected, the encrypted message transfer speed performance did not 
degrade, thus demonstrating that the symmetric RC4 encryption method is extremely fast. 
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The network consumed most message transfer time, which was not consumed by the 
encrypting/decrypting process. 
5.2 Fault Tolerance 
Fault tolerance is a system's ability to supply regular service operations in the presence of 
hardware or software faults. In principle, the absence of centralized control and coordination 
makes P2P systems robust with respect to failures that might occur at any peer. Faults at 
client peers don't usually affect system behavior, but faults at server peers can result in data 
loss. 
As part of the test, we simulated random failures in these 12 peers except to the Group Key 
Manager peer. When one peer failed, as expected, the secure group communication worked 
normally. 
As we simulated that the GKM failed to work, if no new peer joined the group, the secure 
group communication still could work with the existing Group Key. But if a new peer joined 
the group after the GKM was down, because it would send an inquiry message to check who 
was the GKM, at this moment, no one would answer the message, so the newly joined peer 
would elected itself as the GKM and generated a new GK. The new group member would 
encrypt the messages with the new GK; eventually other group members could not correctly 
decrypt the message with their GK. The same situation would happen when the new group 
member received an encrypted message from other members. These faults in GKM can result 
in data loss. 
5.3 Scalability 
Scalability is the degree of adaptability that a system exhibits with respect to increasing-load 
situations. JetMeeting is dynamic and unpredictable in size (growing or shrinking), topology 
(connecting or disconnecting peers), and activity (number or kind of requests). To ensure 
high quality of service, issues such as adaptability with respect to the number of peers, must 
be addressed. 
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In these experiments, we selected a computer, which equipped with a 1.7GHZ Intel Pentium 
4 1.SGHz Processor, 512Mbytes RAM and a lOMbps cable Internet Access, to be the Group 
Key Manager. During the experiments, the GK distribution time was observed depending on 
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Figure 20. Scalability: group key distribution rate growth/reduction with increasing 
number of peers. 
Figure 20 illustrates the scalability behavior of the system during the experiments. Based on 
the results of testing with three joining group members, it was measured whether the group 
key distribution time, which was defined the average time difference between the 
WhoisGKMMsg sent and the EncryptedGrpKeyMsg received by the group member, 
increased or decreased when further peers joined the group communication. 
Scenario 1, if all the other 9 peers joined the group within 3 minutes, the group key 
distribution time increased with an increasing number of peers, which is a sign for limited 
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scalability. This can be explained by the group key distribution model, which is managed by 
the centralized GKM. Rushed traffic cause message collisions because GK handling 
workload is taken only by one GKM. 
Scenario 2, if all the peers randomly joined the group, the group key distribution time did not 
increase with an increasing number of peers, which demonstrates that GK distribution is 
scalable if not all the peers join the group within a short time. The centralized GKM is not 
the bottleneck even though the number of group member grows big but not fast. 
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6. CONCLUSION: ACCOMPLISHMENT, LIMITATIONS AND 
FUTURE WORK 
In this thesis, we presented a system for secure multicasting, which is developments that 
focus on specific aspects in a dynamic P2P application with aiming to deliver real systems. 
The core of the system consists of four functions: Group Key Manager election, Group Key 
generation, Group Key distribution and secure communications. The thesis also evaluates the 
system's efficiency, scalability, and fault tolerance. The results of the evaluation supported 
our claims regarding efficiency and scalability. 
In the core of security, our system is based on mechanisms for protecting sensitive 
communications and resources of a group member via encryption and authentication 
techniques. This Group Key Management protocol is tested to be efficient and scalable and 
can be used to highly dynamic and unpredicted group sizes group chat and collaboration 
applications based on P2P. 
However, some limitations apply to our system. The Group Key Manager is centralized, and 
the GKM election is simple. Malicious users can exploit this mechanism. Another issue is 
that of the group key generation, which is not changed when a peer joins or leaves the group. 
Former malicious group members can be attackers to the secure multicast communications. 
In addition, when GKM starts to operate incorrectly or is down, the faults at GKM can result 
in data loss. 
To make JetMeeting a reliable and secure application, some considerations deserve further 
developments: 
• Reliable handling the GKM' s abnormal leave from a group 
• Looking for an efficient approach to generate a Group Key and distribute it to only 
the members of the group affected by a change 
• Further enhancing the performance of the group key distribution 
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